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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDITOR's NOTr.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

RECEIVERS-

UNLAWFUL PREFERENCES -

EXCESSIVE FEES-

12569-Rossi vs. Colorado Pulp &
Paper Co., et al.-DecidedJanuary 12, 1931.
Facts.-This matter involves the winding up the affairs
of the Colorado Pulp & Paper Company, an insolvent domestic corporation in the hands of a Receiver, who held under
the appointment of the District Court of Adams County.
After such appointment, the District Court temporarily lost
jurisdiction by petitions in Bankruptcy, but the jurisdiction
of the State Court was subsequently restored by the unconditional dismissal of the petition in Bankruptcy, before the
administration of the Bankrupt's Estate, and the State Court
then proceeded to its final determination. This matter was
brought to the Supreme Court by William Rossi, a general
creditor to review the various orders and decrees of the District Court.
Held.-1. General creditors, having repeatedly dealt
with the Receiver in his official capacity and obtained Court
orders that involved recognition of his appointment, thereby
acquiesced in such appointment and cannot now complain of
such appointment on the ground of mere irregularities.
2. Even though such appointment of a Receiver is not
set aside for above reasons, it is not a recognition of the propriety of such Receivership.
3. The Receivership should never have been granted in
the first instance.
4. The filing of a petition in Federal Court in Bankruptcy divests the State Court of jurisdiction.
5. Such filing deposed the Receiver and deprived him
of any further duties, except to preserve the estate.
6. The stipulation entered into between certain of the
parties, which did not include the general creditors, was void
as against general creditors.
BANKRUPTCY-No.

DICTA

7. The general creditors were not estopped from attacking the stipulation.
8. The illegal stipulation acted as a parasite to aid in
sapping the lifeblood of the Receivership's general assets
almost from the start. It has robbed the general creditors of
representation in the person of a receiver, who should have
been unbiased and impartial.
9. The office of a Receiver is in the nature of that of
a Trustee, and the trustee was unfaithful.
10. The practice of throwing business concerns into
Receivership by the District Court must be discouraged,
where grounds for such Receivership are flimsy.
11. In this case the Receivership was improvident, and
unconscionable expenses and costs were incurred.
12. The Receivership never should have been commenced, but having been started, should have been ended
long ago.
13. The Court has authority to wind up the corporation
even though the original suit did not include the dissolution
of the corporation.
Judgment reversed 'with directions.
NOTE: In the two cases of Myers vs. Beck and Myers vs. Colorado Pulp &
Paper Co., both decided on January 12, 1931, the facts were the same as in the above
case and both were reversed for the same reasons.

RECEIVERSHIP-UNLAWFUL

-BANKRUPTCY-No.

PREFERENCES-EXCESSIVE

FEES

12590-Sparling Coal Co. vs. Colo-

rado Pulp & Paper Co., et al.-Decided January 12, 1931.
Facts.-The facts were the same as in the case of Rossi
vs. Colorado Pulp & Paper Co. et al.
Held.-The Court in its discretion may notice any other
error appearing of record, even though the error is not assigned. In liquidation proceedings, the rights of creditors,
debtors, and stockholders, are to be determined as of the time
when it commences. Creditors of a Receivership whose
claims have been proved and allowed under a decree, have a
right to be heard in that Court upon any action of the Court
or receiver, by which they might claim to be aggrieved.
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Allowances of fees, made by the District Court, while a
petition in Bankruptcy was pending in the Federal Court,
cannot be allowed.
Judgment reversed.
LIENS-PLEADING--No. 12234Denver Park & Amusement Co. vs. Kirchoff-Decided
January 12, 1931.
Facts.-Denver Park and Amusement Company owned
certain real estate, which it leased to one, Throckmorton, who,
with its consent, assigned to The Denver Greyhound Racing
Association. The American National Bank, as Trustee for
bondholders, held a mortgage on the property, and the Greyhound Company erected thereon and operated, a dog-racing
enterprise, in which gambling was indulged in on the races.
Kirchoff, having furnished material and labor, filed his
mechanics' lien statement and brought the action to foreclose.
Other lien claimants brought counter claims for foreclosure
of their liens. One of the defences of the owner of the land
was that Kirchoff, in furnishing the material, knew that it was
being furnished for the purpose of erecting a racetrack for
racing dogs, and for the purpose of gambling and wagering in
violation of the laws of the state. The Court below sustained
a demurrer to this defense.
Held.-The demurrer to this particular defence should
not have been sustained. This defence set out an attempted
enforcement of an illegal contract as to which the parties
stand in pari delicto, and the defendant was entitled to present
such defense.
Judgment reversed.
GAMBLING-MECHANICS

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SEWERS-DAMAGES-No.

12394

-City and County of Denver vs. Mason-Decided January
19, 1931.
Facts.-Mason had judgment for $1250.00 for damages
to her property during 1925, 1926, and 1927, as the result of
the negligence of the City in the construction and maintenance

of certain sewers. The City contended that no liability existed
for injuries sustained as the result of the exercise of its quasi
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judicial discretion in the adoption of a defective or insufficient
sewer system, and that no negligence was shown in the construction and maintenance thereof.
Held.-Where a sewer, as originally planned and constructed, was found to result in direct and physical injury to
the property of another, that would not otherwise have happened, and which, from its nature is liable to be repeated and
continuous, but is remediable by a change of plan, or the
adoption of prudent measures, the municipal corporation is
liable for such damages as occur in consequence of the original
cause, after notice and an omission to use ordinary care to
remedy the evil.
Judgment affirmed.
PLEADING -

DEMURRER -

INTERVENTION -

APPEAL -

No.

12412-The Commercial Credit Co. vs. John A. HigbeeDecided January 19, 1931.
Facts.-In an action brought by the defendant in error
against another, an automobile was attached as the property
of the defendant below, who was not a party on appeal. The
plaintiff in error, claiming ownership, filed a petition of
intervention; to this petition, the defendant in error, plaintiff
below, interposed a demurrer which was sustained. The
intervenor elected to stand on its demurrer. Other than sustaining the demurrer and fixing a time for tendering a bill
of exceptions, no other orders were made, and no final judgment entered.
Held.-Entry of final judgment is requisite to the right
to predicate and prosecute error.
The Writ is dismissed, but without prejudice to further
appropriate proceedings in the court below.
BROKERS -

REAL

ESTATE

COMMISSION -

PLEADING -

No.

12253-Kinney vs. Wither-Decided January 19, 1931.
Facts.-Defendantsbelow employed the plaintiff Kinney,
real estate broker, to sell land, and agreed to pay him as a
commission $2,190.00, the first half of the commission to be
paid out of the first cash payment of the purchase price, and
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the second half out of the second payment. The defendants
paid the first half of the commission, but not the second half.
The complaint alleged that the defendants accepted as payment in lieu of the second cash payment the promissory note
of the purchaser, later brought an action against the purchaser,
recovered judgment, and realized on the judgment more than
the amount of the balance due on the commissions.
Held.-It was not essential to plaintiff's recovery to prove
that the defendants accepted the note of the buyers as the
equivalent of actual payment because when the defendants
brought suit against the buyers to recover the second payment
of the purchase price, and realized therefrom more than the
second half of the commission, the defendants were liable
for the payment of the balance of the commission.
Judgment reversed and remanded 'with instructions.
STATUTE

OF

FRAUDS-PART

PERFORMANCE-No.

12757-

Jutten vs. Deeble-Decided January 19, 1931.

Facts.-Deeble and Jutten made an oral contract whereby the former agreed to sell, and the latter agreed to buy,
certain real estate. Claiming Jutten refused to carry out the
contract, Deeble sued Jutten for specific performance, and
obtained a decree therefor.
Held.-1. The Court below found that there was a contract, and that the consideration was $1,600.00. This finding
is conclusive, being upon conflicting evidence.
2. Defendant pleaded Statute of Frauds, claiming that
because the contract was oral, it was unenforceable. However, Jutten paid $100.00 on the purchase price and the seller
ousted his tenant and delivered possession to Jutten, the purchaser. There was a partial performance of the contract
sufficient to take it out of the Statute of Frauds.
Judgment affirmed.
MANDAMUS -

CIVIL SERVICE -

CHIEF CLERK-VACANCY-

No. 12661-Civil Service Commission vs. People, ex rel.
Beates-Decided January 26, 1931.

Facts,.-Beates, an employee in the office of the Secretary
of State brought mandamus action to compel Civil Service
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Commission to certify for and appoint her to the position of
Chief Information Clerk, Motor Vehicle Department. She
was second on eligible list, but the one prior on list had never
been tendered nor had ever refused the appointment.
Held.-It not having been shown that the first person
on the eligible list had either been tendered or had refused
such appointment or had failed to make demand therefor
upon request of relator, the second on the list, obviously relator had no clear legal right to demand the position sought
and therefore cannot maintain mandamus.
Judgment reversed.

MANDAMUS-SCHOOL DISTRICT-JOINT DISTRICT-BOUNDA-

RIES--No. 12367---Smith vs. Joint School District No. 3Decided January 26, 1931.
Facts.-This was a mandamus action brought by Joint
School District number 3, lying partly in Otero county and
partly in Crowley county, against Smith, County Superintendent to compel her to correct records of her office so as to show
the correct boundaries of school district number 16, of Otero
county, and School District number 3, lying partly in Otero
and Crowley counties, particularly as to show that sections 5
and 6 were part of Joint School District number 3.
Held.-I. Joint School District number 3 had capacity
to sue because even though irregularly created, it has been
recognized as a school district for over twenty years, and its
existence as a legal entity throughout that period had never
been questioned.
2. Mandamus is the proper remedy because it only
required a ministerial act, that of a county superintendent to
correct her records showing the proper boundary.
3. School District number 16, of' Otero County, was
not a necessary party, nor were the bondholders thereof, because no relief was sought against School District No. 16,
nor any of the bondholders.
Judgment affirmed.

DICTA
AUTOMOBILES-RIGHT OF WAY-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

-No. 12419-Knifer vs. De Julio, et al.-DecidedJanuary
26, 1931.
Facts.-In an automobile damage suit, defendants in
error, defendants below, had judgment upon a verdict directed
by the District Court. Plaintiff was driving an automobile
South on country road. Defendant was driving his car East
on an intersecting road. Plaintiff testified that he saw defendant's car approaching the intersection at approximately 150
feet therefrom at an excessive rate of speed and on the wrong
side of the road, that plaintiff's brakes were in good condition,
and that he had ample time to stop, but did not do so. The
collision resulted.
Held.-The plaintiff, by his own testimony was clearly
guilty of contributory negligence, and the facts being undisputed, it was the duty of the lower court to so hold as a
matter of law and direct a verdict.
Judgment affirmed.
NOTES-USURY-MONEY LENDERS' ACT-No.
12693-Angleton and Yeargan vs. The Franklin Finance
Co.-Decided January 26, 1931.
Facts.-Angleton and Yeargan, plaintiffs, co-makers on
a note payable to Franklin Finance Company brought action
to cancel their liability thereon. They were successful in the
County Court, unsuccessful in the District Court. Contention
was that loan being for less than $300.00 and more than 12
per cent having been charged, concealed in brokerage charges
and other items, that the note was void.
Held.-The amount which the lender actually loans the
borrower will determine whether or not the transaction comes
within chapter 63 compiled laws of 1921. In this case, the
defendant was attempting to avoid the consequences of a violation of the money lenders' act. The amount of the loan being
under $300.00 and defendant having made charges in addition to the statutory amount allowable, the contract is void
and the note is unenforcible.
Judgment reversed.
BILLS AND

DICTA
BILLS AND NOTES-CONSIDERATION-MISREPRESENTATIONBANK STOCKHOLDERS' LIABILITY-No. 12354-Campbell

vs. Hoch-Decided January 26, 1931.
Facts.-Hoch sued Campbell on her promissory note.
Defense was no consideration, misrepresentation, and that the
minds of the parties never met. Campbell was owner of
shares of the capital stock in First National Bank of Yuma.
The capital stock became impaired and it was necessary to
levy an assessment. Before assessment was levied, stockholders
met and agreed to raise the necessary money that would be
required by an assessment and defendant gave her note for her
respective quota.
Held.-l. There was ample consideration for the note.
2. There was no misrepresentation.
3. The minds of the parties met.
4. She was liable on the note.
Judgment affirmed.
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